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Global Constitutionalism in the Early Modern Period: 
The Role of Empires, Treaties and Natural Law 
Martine Julia van Ittersum 
University of Dundee 
Introduction 
Written treatises have become sacrosanct in modern international law. Printed 
volumes filled with agreements between sovereign rulers and/or states have rolled from 
the presses in Western Europe since the seventeenth century. Textbooks on international 
law inform us that it was the rise of positivism in the nineteenth century – a strong 
preference for treaties and international conventions as sources of law – which signalled 
the birth of modern international law. Indeed, the entire edifice of world courts that has 
come into existence in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries – the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, etc. –  
rests on written agreements between states. The same applies, of course, to the 
establishment of the League of Nations (1920) and United Nations (1945) and their 
subsidiaries (Lesaffer 2012; Shaw 1995, pp. 21-100; for a very different account of the 
origins of modern international law see Anghie 2005; Koskenniemi 2001, 2012). No 
wonder, then, that when the UN adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in 2007, it included a clause affirming the right of native peoples  
to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have 
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive 
arrangements (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 
Sept. 2007, clause 37). 
This is a draft chapter / article. The final version is available in Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, edited 
by Anthony F. Lang & Antje Wiener, published in 2017 by Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. The material cannot be 
used for any other purpose without further permission of the publisher, and is for private use only.
 
Indigenous activists and their white supporters pushed for the inclusion of this clause in 
the UN Declaration. They have long embraced intercultural dialogue and treaty-making 
as the way forward.   
This chapter offers a critique of the recent fetishism of treaties, particularly the 
lazy and mistaken assumption that treaties are ironclad guarantees for indigenous rights.  
It explores the relationship between European expansion overseas, treaty making and 
natural law in the early modern period, focusing in particular on the Dutch jurist Hugo 
Grotius (1583-1645). The man hailed in the twentieth century as ‘father of international 
law’ was known in his own time for his steadfast support for the Dutch East India 
Company or VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie). His understanding of natural 
law, particularly the notion of pacta sunt servanda (‘treaties must be performed’), cannot 
be separated from his justification of Dutch empire-building in the East Indies. There was 
nothing equal about the VOC’s treaty relationship with the inhabitants of the Spice 
Islands (i.e. the present-day Maluku Islands in Indonesia). Grotius knew this. Indeed, he 
vigorously defended these unequal treaties in his De Indiis/On the Indies – written in 
1604-08, but only published in the nineteenth century as De Jure Praedae/On the Law of 
Prize and Booty (Grotius, 2006)  – and, of course, in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis/On the 
Law of War and Peace, first published in 1625 and reprinted many times afterwards 
(Grotius, 2005). The VOC and the native inhabitants of the Spice Islands were bound 
together in a protection/tribute exchange. The VOC’s role was to shield the islanders 
from foreign invasions, particularly attacks by the, allegedly, ‘tyrannical’ Spanish and 
Portuguese.  In return, the islanders were obliged to sell all their produce to the VOC – in 
perpetuity and for a fixed price determined by the VOC. Crucially, it was up to the VOC 
 
to monitor indigenous performance of the treaties. If it deemed the natives deficient in 
any way, it could punish them as transgressors of the natural law, waging a ‘just war’ 
against them. By these means, the VOC became, first, co-ruler in the Spice Islands, and, 
subsequently, a full-fledged sovereign. The history of treaty making, then, is closely 
connected with that of Western imperialism and colonialism. It is certainly no panacea 
for the protection of indigenous rights.  
James Tully, who served on the Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples from 1991 until 1995, is far more positive about the role (to be) played by 
treaties in relations between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples of Canada. In 
section I, we examine both Tully’s pronouncements on treaty making in his magisterial 
Public Philosophy in a New Key (2008) and recent contributions to the debate by 
historians.  The role which written documents have played in European relations with 
native peoples since 1500 is the focus of two essay volumes edited by the historian Saliha 
Belmessous: Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 1500-1920 (2012) and 
Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900 (2015). Not surprisingly, 
the contributors disagree about the question whether, and to what extent, aboriginal 
peoples were able to ‘negotiate’ or ‘resist’ empire. Section II provides a short overview 
of the eventful life and career of Hugo Grotius, while section III focuses on his 
justification of Dutch expansion overseas. There is a clear connection with his 
conceptualization of the Dutch Revolt against Philip II of Spain and Portugal.  In cases of 
divided sovereignty, so Grotius argued, the entities acting as co-rulers – be they the States 
of Holland or the VOC – were entitled to punish transgressors of the natural law – be 
they Philip II of Spain and Portugal or the VOC’s native allies – and to wage a ‘just war’ 
 
against them. By these means, co-rulers could acquire all the ‘marks of sovereignty,’ 
resulting in Dutch independence in Europe and the establishment of a colonial empire 
overseas. Section IV presents a case study: the role of treaties in the violent Dutch 
conquest of the Banda Islands between 1609 and 1621. I argue that, in the European 
encounter with ‘the other,’ treaty making should not be seen as an alternative to conquest 
and war, but as, in fact, integral to the process of ‘dispossessing the native.’ 
This has important implications for our understanding of modern-day global 
constitutionalism, which functions as an extension of international law and which relies 
upon textual guarantees in its support of the rule of law. Significantly, there has been 
little engagement with indigenous rights in the secondary literature on global 
constitutionalism – with the notable exception, that is, of a recent editorial in the 
eponymous journal. Critiquing the current state of the field of global law and governance, 
the editors of Global Constitutionalism point out that ‘indigenous peoples have been 
dispossessed of and removed from their life ways and ecosystems in which Homo sapiens 
co-evolved for 150,000 years in the name of development and progress,’ and argue for 
the alternative paradigm of ‘eco-social constitutionalisation,’ which includes ‘learning 
from and with indigenous peoples and their earth ways (Tully et al. 2016, p 9, 12). 
However well-intentioned, this conceptualization threatens to resurrect the hoary 
dichotomy of the Roussean ‘noble savage’ living in harmony with nature versus the 
depraved, yet simultaneously ‘civilized’, city dweller (Pagden 1982, 1994). It is a well-
known, and misleading, trope in Western culture, which tells us nothing about day-to-day 
interactions between indigenous communities and, for example, transnational 
corporations (TNCs), or about the various strategies adopted by TNCs to either persuade 
 
or force these communities to comply with their demands.  Nor is it unprecedented for 
TNCs to operate as ‘shadow sovereigns’ (Tully et al. 2016, p 7).  In the days of Grotius, 
both the Dutch and English East India Companies operated as corporations alongside – 
and often in competition with – the two corporate bodies known as the Dutch and English 
states (Stern 2011; see also Pettigrew 2015). Paramount state sovereignty, either as a 
reality or as a norm in international law, is a rather recent phenomenon. Sadly, it has not 
worked for many native peoples in their power struggles with TNCs. We may want to 
find out why that is. Could it be that the written culture that is so crucial for the 
functioning of modern states and modern corporations puts native peoples at a 
disadvantage?  
I. Indigenous Peoples and Treaty Making 
In Public Philosophy in a New Key, James Tully boldly re-conceptualizes 
relations between the First Nations and other inhabitants of Canada on the basis of five 
fundamental principles: ‘mutual recognition, intercultural negotiation, mutual respect, 
sharing and mutual responsibility’ (Tully 2008, p. 229). He assigns an important role to 
treaty making in the process of reconciliation between the aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
peoples of Canada: 
Specific types of relations are agreed to, written down as treaties, put into practice, 
reviewed and renewed.  It is not a once-and-for-all agreement, as in social contract 
theories, nor an accord frozen in a constitutional document.  It is a conversation 
between the members of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cultures in all walks of life 
over the time they live together and share the land (Tully 2008, p. 239). 
 
He makes a point of explicitly rejecting a world view which justified the colonial 
relationship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  The so-called ‘stages’ theory of 
history ranked Europeans at the top – as, supposedly, bearers of civilization – and 
 
consigned aboriginal peoples to the most primitive stage, as, allegedly, living in a state of 
nature, totally devoid of government or territorial rights. This understanding of European-
native relations has not survived the collapse of European empires after the Second 
World War. As Tully notes, aboriginal peoples around the world demand that the process 
of decolonialization be extended to them as well (Tully 2008, pp. 227-228).   
Tully urges both the First Nations and other inhabitants of Canada to recognize 
each other as ‘equal peoples who govern themselves and their lands by their own laws 
and cultures’. He claims to take his cue from early modern treaty making, a period of 
time when, allegedly, Europeans and natives were evenly matched and treated each other 
as equals. Of course, he realizes that the treaty system has suffered from constant abuse. 
He nevertheless values what he considers the original intentions behind early-modern 
treaty making, namely to settle differences ‘by means of discussion and consent, without 
interfering in the internal government of either society’ (Tully 2008, p. 226; see also The 
Economist, 2015).   
Unfortunately, few historians of European overseas expansion will recognize 
Tully’s reconstruction of events. Prior to 1800, European explorers, traders, settlers and 
colonial officials did not exactly embrace the principles of equality and non-interference, 
neither in their own societies, nor in their dealings with aboriginal peoples. It is a moot 
point whether Tully’s belief in an idealized past will prove an aid or a hindrance to his 
efforts to improve the lot of the First Nations.  
 Historians have entered the debate about treaty-making past and present through 
the work of Saliha Belmessous, editor of Native Claims: Indigenous Law against Empire, 
1500-1920 and Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900 
 
(Belmessous 2012, 2015). The two essay volumes raise the important question whether 
treaties between Europeans and indigenous populations around the world can be read as 
alternatives to conquest and war, and, possibly, as the means by which indigenous 
peoples have sought to turn the tide of Western imperialism and colonialism. Belmessous 
notes in her introduction to Empire by Treaty that ‘today great expectations are placed on 
treaties for the resolution of conflicts over indigenous rights in postcolonial settler 
societies’ (Belmessous 2015, p. 15). In his concluding remarks, Paul Patton goes so far as 
to argue that the treaty relationship reflects a desire ‘on all sides’ to legitimize settler 
sovereignty ‘by reference to the consent, however belated or hypothetical, of … 
indigenous peoples’ (Belmessous 2015, p. 268). Not all contributors to Empire by Treaty 
are so sanguine about the ability of native peoples to negotiate or resist empire. In her 
essay chapter on territorial conflict and alliance-making in pre-1800 South America, 
Tamar Herzog convincingly shows that treatises were ‘instruments of containment’ 
aimed at realizing ‘– to the degree that this was possible – the subjection of all things 
indigenous’ (Belmessous 2015, pp. 78-79). Dane Kennedy points out in his H-net review 
of Empire by Treaty that the history of treaty making raises serious concerns about the 
legitimacy of settler sovereignty, since ‘indigenous consent was often coerced’ (Kennedy 
2015).  The issue of meaningful consent is, indeed, a crucial one. 
II. The Life and Times of Hugo Grotius 
Before we turn to Grotius’ justification of Dutch expansion overseas and its 
relation to the importance of treaty making, a short overview of his eventful life and 
career is in order.  The connections which Grotius made between the struggle for Dutch 
independence and the creation of a colonial empire overseas cannot be divorced from his 
own political career in Holland in the 1600s and 1610s. 
 
Grotius was born into a prominent regent (i.e. patrician) family in Delft on Easter 
Day 1583. Just two years earlier, the Dutch States General had abjured Philip II of Spain 
and Portugal as the ruler of the Low Countries and created a new state, the Dutch 
Republic. Grotius started his professional life as a private solicitor, at the tender age of 
sixteen. In 1604, the VOC directors asked him to write a defense of the Company’s 
privateering campaign in Asian waters, particularly its aggressive attacks on Portuguese 
ships and fortresses. Grotius was happy to oblige, and completed his De Indiis in 1607-
08. This treatise of 163 folios remained in manuscript for another two-and-a-half 
centuries. At the Directors’ request, Grotius did publish chapter twelve of De Indiis 
separately in 1609 as Mare Liberum/The Free Sea ‘or …the Right Which the Hollanders 
Ought to Have to the Indian Trade.’  He continued to support the VOC in word and deed 
for the rest of his life, negotiating on the Company’s behalf with the English East India 
Company (or EIC) in 1613 and 1615, for example (van Ittersum, 2006; Grotius 2004 and 
2006; Nellen 2015, pp. 1-164).  
Thanks to the patronage of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, de facto political leader of 
the Dutch Republic and a friend of Grotius’ father, he was quickly appointed to a number 
of high-level political positions at the provincial and federal level. He became Advocate-
Fiscal (i.e. public prosecutor) of Holland in December 1607 and Pensionary (i.e. chief 
legal adviser) of the town of Rotterdam in June 1613. In the latter capacity, Grotius 
joined the Rotterdam delegation in the States of Holland. In May 1617, he became a 
member of the Holland delegation in the Dutch States General, the federal government of 
the Dutch Republic. By all accounts, it was a meteoric political career. Grotius would 
undoubtedly have succeeded Oldenbarnevelt as political leader of the Dutch Republic, 
 
had it not been for religious troubles that brought the rebel state to the brink of collapse 
during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–21). Orthodox Calvinists squared off against the 
so-called ‘Remonstrants,’ followers of the Leiden theologian Arminius. Although 
Arminius’ followers were a minority in the Dutch Reformed Church, they enjoyed the 
support of the States of Holland, in particular of Oldenbarnevelt and Grotius. The 
theological bickering developed into a major political crisis that endangered the existence 
of the Dutch Republic. Prince Maurice of Orange, commander-in-chief of the country’s 
naval and military forces and Stadtholder (i.e. governor) of six of its seven provinces, 
could not stand idly by. In August 1618, he sought to break the political deadlock by 
means of a regime change, which landed Grotius in prison for almost three years. In view 
of his close association with Oldenbarnevelt—executed in May 1619—he was lucky to 
escape with his life (Nellen 2015, pp. 165-293; Nellen and Trapman, 1996; den Tex, 
1973). 
Yet Grotius’ political career was far from over. In March 1621, he escaped from 
Loevestein Castle in a book trunk. He headed south to Paris, where he lived as an exile 
for many years and received a pension from the French Crown. As a quid pro quo, he 
dedicated De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) to Louis XIII of France.  Cardinal De Richelieu 
was eager to tap Grotius’ in-depth knowledge of Dutch overseas expansion and 
commercial governance, and sought to involve him in the establishment of a French East 
India Company.  Yet Grotius was unwilling to burn his bridges behind him.  For a long 
time he believed that he would be reinstated as Pensionary of Rotterdam once Prince 
Maurice’s younger brother and heir, Prince Frederic Henry, had established himself in 
power.  Grotius returned to Holland in October 1631 in order to force a breakthrough in 
 
the negotiations about his possible rehabilitation. His ostentatious visits to Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam badly backfired, however. In April 1632, the States of Holland exiled him 
once more and put a price of 2,000 guilders on his head. The definitive breach with his 
homeland came after two unhappy years in Hamburg. Grotius accepted the offer of the 
Swedish chancellor Axel Oxenstierna to become the resident Swedish ambassador in 
Paris. In the context of the Thirty Years War, this was an important and sensitive 
position: after the death of King Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish armies in Germany 
were essentially kept afloat with French subsidies. It was Grotius’ job to maintain good 
relations with the French ally, particularly Cardinal de Richelieu. He discharged this task 
for nearly ten years, albeit with uneven success, due to French opposition to his 
appointment. He was finally recalled by the Swedish government in January 1645 and 
arrived in Stockholm five months later. He refused to become one of Queen Christina’s 
privy councilors, however, and took the first ship back to France. After a storm-ridden 
voyage across the Baltic, his ship was wrecked off the Pomeranian coast in August 1645. 
Although Grotius safely reached the shore, he died at an inn in Rostock, aged 62. He was 
buried in the family crypt in the New Church in Delft (Nellen 2015, pp. 293-763; van 
Ittersum 2010).  
III. Hugo Grotius and Treaty Making 
Grotius vigorously defended Dutch expansion overseas in several publications, 
including De Jure Belli ac Pacis, and in memoranda written for the VOC directors, the 
States of Holland and Dutch States General. His understanding of natural law, 
particularly the notion of pacta sunt servanda (‘treaties must be performed’), was crucial 
in this respect.   The VOC engaged in a protection/tribute exchange with its native allies, 
 
thus inserting itself as a co-ruler in, for example, the Spice Islands (Grotius, 2005 and 
2006; van Ittersum, 2006; Clulow, 2009; Benton and Clulow, 2015).  Both Grotius and the 
Company directors presented this arrangement as a war of liberation, pitting the VOC and 
its native allies against the ‘tyrannical’ Spanish and Portuguese.   As Grotius put it in De 
Jure Praedae: 
 
The Dutch sailor knows that he is fighting in defence of the law of nations while 
his foes are fighting against the fellowship of mankind; he knows that they fight 
to establish despotism, but that he himself is defending his own 
liberty and the liberty of others (Ms. BPL 917, f. 159; Grotius, 2006, p. 483). 
 
Under natural law, so Grotius argued, the VOC was allowed to act as judge and 
executioner in its own cause.  This went beyond self-defense.  Both on the high seas and 
in Asian territories, the VOC was entitled to punish any transgressor of the natural law.   
In the first instance, the VOC went after European competitors, particularly the subjects 
of the King of Spain and Portugal, who, allegedly, showed little respect for the freedom 
of trade and navigation mandated by natural law.  Not coincidentally, the Dutch Republic 
was fighting a war of independence against the selfsame ruler.  Yet natural law was 
equally applicable to the Company’s native allies –or so Grotius and the VOC directors 
thought.   If native allies did not keep their side of the bargain –by sabotaging the 
Company’s efforts to monopolize the spice trade, for example-- they were liable to 
punishment by the VOC in a ‘just war.’  A case in point is the Company’s violent 
subjugation of the Banda Islands, a group of tiny islands west of New Guinea.   On 
various occasions, the Bandanese sought to sell nutmeg and mace to Asian merchants and 
the English East India Company, in spite of treaties to the contrary concluded with the 
VOC.   Grotius wholly endorsed the Company’s efforts to punish Bandanese ‘rebels’, 
 
resulting in the archipelago’s subjection to Dutch rule by 1621 (van Ittersum, 2006, pp. 
359-483; Arthur Weststeijn, 2014). 
 It is important to realize that Grotius’ understanding of the situation in the Banda 
Islands was not very different from the way he conceptualized the Dutch Revolt against 
Philip II of Spain and Portugal.  For Grotius, divided sovereignty was the norm, both in 
Asia and Europe.  He saw clear parallels between the way the VOC acted as co-ruler in 
the Banda Islands and the way the States of Holland became fully sovereign and 
independent as a result of its ‘just war’ against Philip II of Spain and Portugal.   
Allegedly, the Habsburg ruler and his representatives in the Low Countries had exceeded 
their constitutional powers by imposing taxes without the consent of the Dutch States 
General and the various provincial assemblies.  The States of Holland and other 
provincial assemblies were justified in their decision to take up arms against Philip II, 
acquiring all the marks of sovereignty in the process.  In this train of thought, it was the 
States of Holland that, acting in its capacity as co-ruler, punished Philip II for his failure 
to respect the (unwritten) Dutch constitution and for breaking his contractual relationship 
with his Dutch subjects.   Similarly, the VOC took up arms in the Banda Islands in order 
to ensure (what it considered to be) the proper performance of contracts, becoming the 
islands’ sole ruler in the process (Borschberg, 1994 and 2011, pp. 78-105; Waszink, 
forthcoming; Van Ittersum, 2016). 
IV. A Case Study of Treaty Making and Armed Conflict in the Banda Islands, 1609-
16211  
 
                                                        1 For a fuller account, see van Ittersum, 2016. 
 
Located 2,000 kilometers east of Java, the Banda Islands – a group of seven small 
islands, including one volcano, the Gunung Api – are now a forgotten backwater in the 
Republic of Indonesia. It used to be very different. For centuries, the islands were part of 
an Asian trading network connecting the island of Java with the Philippines and the South 
China Sea. Merchants from ports on Java’s north coast visited on a regular basis, 
exchanging rice from Java and textiles from the Indian subcontinent for nutmeg and 
mace. They brought Islam as well. Like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, state development 
was slow in the Banda Islands. Confederations of villages competed with each other, 
primarily ulilima (a group of five villages) and ulisiva (a group of nine villages). 
Orangkayas (aristocrats, generally with wealth from trade) met on the island of Nera in 
order to reduce conflict between villages and negotiate trade deals. Although the 
Bandanese successfully played off Javanese merchants against each other, they had 
become dependent on the spice trade for their livelihoods. Not much was left of the 
islands’ original subsistence economy by the time the first Europeans arrived in the 
sixteenth century (Reid 1988, vol 1, pp. 11-13, 90-96, vol 2, pp. 1-61, 114-173; Gupta, 
1987; Knaap, 2004).  
Nutmeg, mace, and cloves had reached Europe via ports in the Middle East during 
the Middle Ages. One of the aims of European expansion into Asia was to cut out 
Muslim middlemen, and establish direct trade links with the Spice Islands. The 
Portuguese were the first to reach the Banda Islands. However, they were not able to 
establish a military presence there, in sharp contrast with the Moluccas and Ambon, 
where they built and garrisoned fortresses. Nor did the Portuguese obtain any special 
 
trading privileges in the Banda Islands, but traded on the same footing as Javanese 
merchants (Villiers 1981; Vlekke 1944, pp. 68-90).  
The situation in the Banda Islands changed completely when the VOC appeared 
on the scene. Swift Dutch penetration of Southeast Asia went hand-in-hand with naked 
aggression against both Portuguese and indigenous shipping. The voyage of Pieter 
Willemszoon Verhoef (1573-1609) – the VOC’s so-called Fourth Voyage (1607-1612) – 
was crucial in tipping the balance of power in the Banda Islands. For the first time, the 
Bandanese had to accept a European military presence in their country. Dutch fortresses 
were established on Nera in 1609, on Pulo Way in 1616 and on Great Banda (also known 
as Lonthor) in 1621. Yet indigenous inhabitants had no intention of surrendering without 
a fight, and took up arms against the VOC. A complex situation was complicated even 
further by the presence of merchants and mariners employed by the EIC, eager to secure 
their own trading interests (Locher-Scholten and Rietbergen, 2004; Knaap and Teitler, 
2002; Milton, 1999; Loth, 1995; Keay, 1993; Masselman 1963; Chaudhuri, 1965; Foster, 
1933).  
 By establishing fortresses in Asia, the VOC sought to tighten up the 
protection/tribute exchange with its native allies and strengthen its position as a co-ruler 
in these territories. The Bandanese saw things differently, of course. As Adam Clulow 
notes, the orangkayas ‘had long been accustomed to finding security by playing off 
foreign powers’ (Clulow, 2016 p. 30). Until Verhoef’s arrival in the archipelago, they had 
treated the VOC as simply one more merchant bidding for their produce. If and when the 
VOC failed to supply the trade goods they required, such as textiles and rice, they had 
been at liberty to sell their nutmeg and mace to somebody else, and frequently did. 
 
Verhoef was determined to change that. His murder in May 1609 suggests that many 
Bandanese objected to a close military alliance with the VOC, and were desperate to 
avoid the construction of a Dutch fortress. Did they suspect that, ultimately, it would 
result in a complete loss of indigenous sovereignty (van Opstall 1972, pp. 94-105, 267-
269; Purchas 1905-1907, vol II, pp. 534-539)?  
 Thanks to the presence of William Keeling (1577/8-1620) in the Banda Islands in 
spring 1609, followed by visits of other EIC merchants and commanders, native 
opponents of the VOC were confident that they could play off the English against the 
Dutch and thus regain control of the situation. The Bandanese suffered from internal 
divisions, however. According to the Dutch Governor-General Laurens Reael (1583-
1637), they governed themselves ‘entirely in a democratic fashion [populariter], like a 
republic’ (van Opstall, 1979 p. 197)  – not exactly a compliment in the seventeenth 
century. It may explain why they dismissed Keeling’s suggestion to surrender their 
sovereignty to the King of England. Only in April 1616, when VOC commander Jan 
Dirckszoon Lam (d. 1626) was about to launch an all-out assault, did inhabitants of Pulo 
Way enact a ceremony formally acknowledging James I of England as their protector. It 
failed to stop Lam’s conquest of the island. But it did create a very useful precedent for 
the EIC. Eight months later, Nathaniel Courthope had little difficulty persuading 
inhabitants of Pulu Run – many of whom were refugees from Pulo Way – to repeat the 
ceremony and sign a treaty with him (Foster, 1933 pp. 261-267; Foster, 1905 pp. 328-
329; Stapel, 1939, vol III, p. 99; Loth, 1995, pp. 713-714; van Goor, 2015, p. 281). 
 Meanwhile, VOC officials continued to sign contracts with the Bandanese as 
well, primarily with inhabitants of Rosengain and Great Banda. From the VOC 
 
perspective, the conquests of Nera and Pulo Way in 1609 and 1616, respectively, had 
turned local populations into Company subjects. By concluding treaties with inhabitants 
of Rosengain and Great Banda, both Lam and Reael sought to obtain native recognition 
of the changed status of Nera and Pulo Way, secure a steady supply of nutmeg and mace 
for the VOC, and completely isolate Pulo Run and its inhabitants, who had sided with the 
English. Although Reael failed to launch a successful invasion of Pulo Run in the spring 
of 1617 and 1618, he used all other means at his disposal to make life difficult for 
Courthope and his indigenous allies. He forbade any contact between Bandanese allies of 
the VOC and inhabitants of Pulo Run, for example. The wavering loyalties of the 
Bandanese proved to be the Achilles’ heel of his strategy. In summer 1618, Reael signed 
a truce treaty just with the ‘orangkayas and magistrates’ of Selamon, not with any other 
villages on Great Banda. Those villages had effectively sided with the inhabitants of Pulo 
Run (Stapel, 1939, vol. III, pp. 102-104; Foster, 1933, pp. 261-270; Heeres and Stapel, 
1907, pp. 66-69 (treaty with the Bandanese of 10 August 1609), 122-124 (treaty with the 
Bandanese of 3 May 1616), 127-130 (treaty with the Bandanese of 30 April 1617), 133-
135 (treaty with the Bandanese of 25 June 1617), 160-161 (treaty with the Bandanese, 
March 1621?), 162-170 (treaty with the Bandanese of 9 May 1621).  
 From the Dutch perspective, the next logical step was to conquer and pacify Great 
Banda. More nutmeg trees grew on Great Banda than on all the other islands of the 
archipelago combined. The inhabitants of Pulo Run were crucially dependent for their 
survival on foodstuffs and water reaching them from Great Banda. In other words, a 
Dutch conquest of the island would make it impossible for the English to continue in 
actual possession of Pulo Run. And so it turned out to be. Inhabitants of Great Banda 
 
repulsed Lam’s expeditionary force in June 1618, but were soundly defeated by the 
Dutch Governor-General Jan Pieterzoon Coen (1587-1629) three years later. The Treaty 
of Defence, concluded by the VOC and EIC in London in June 1619, proved an 
unexpected benefit in pacifying the archipelago. Since the companies were now officially 
allied, neither the EIC merchants in Bantam and Jakarta, nor the few Englishmen left at 
Pulo Run, dared to interfere with Coen’s invasion plans, or offer any support to the 
Bandanese (Van Goor, 2015, pp. 433-465; Loth, 1995, pp. 724-727).  
Coen’s brutal conquest of Great Banda is an inconvenient truth for many present-
day global historians, eager to ascribe agency to indigenous peoples through various 
forms of ‘negotiating’ and ‘resisting’ empire. Yet the power differential between 
Europeans and certain native groups in Asia and the Americas is something that we 
ignore at our peril. At the time, many Bandanese clearly underestimated the VOC’s 
determination to secure a monopoly of the spice trade and the enormous resources which 
it could marshal against a weak, isolated polity. Of course, there were plenty of areas in 
the pre-modern world where Europeans struggled to get a foot in the door. Yet the Banda 
Islands was not one of these (Clulow, 2013 and 2016; Meuwese, 2012). 
Coen’s punitive expedition resulted in the near-total destruction of Bandanese 
society. Forty-eight orangkayas were captured, tried and executed at his order. Their 
relatives – approximately 789 old men, women and children – were shipped off to 
Batavia (modern-day Jakarta), the VOC headquarters in Asia, where they were put to 
work as slaves. In the end, there were only about 1,000 of an estimated 15,000 original 
inhabitants left in the Banda Islands. The arable land on Great Banda was divided into 
plots called perken, and distributed among European tenants. Many of these so-called 
 
perkeniers were former VOC soldiers. Together with Company officials, they would 
form the upper crust of the new colonial society for centuries to come. In cultivating and 
harvesting the valuable spices, they could dispose of a large labor force of slaves, 
imported by the VOC from all parts of Asia. The Dutch conquest marked a fundamental 
break with the past (Van Goor, 2015, pp. 433-466; Winn, 2010, pp. 365-389; Loth, 1995, 
pp. 13-35; Niemeijer, 1994, pp. 2-24; Hanna, 1978). 
Conclusion 
 So was there such a thing as empire by treaty? Our analysis of Grotius’ 
justification of Dutch expansion overseas and our case study of Anglo-Dutch imperial 
competition the Banda Islands suggests that, yes, treaties played an important role in the 
rise of Western imperialism and colonialism.  Written documents were no alternative to 
conflict and war, but an essential part of it.  Europeans used treaties to make claims to 
trade and territories in early modern Asia, Africa and the Americas and to (violently) 
contest the claims of others, be they indigenous peoples or European competitors.  Armed 
violence was the ever-present and none-too-subtle threat at the negotiating table, both in 
Europe and overseas.  Grotius was well aware of this, twice negotiating face-to-face with 
EIC representatives about the Dutch and English claims to the Spice Islands.  Indeed, his 
understanding of divided sovereignty and its implications, combined with the natural law 
notion of pacta sunt servanda, made it possible for him to justify the struggle for Dutch 
independence and the establishment of a VOC empire in Asia in very similar terms.  Just 
like the States of Holland could punish Philip II of Spain and Portugal for transgressing 
the (unwritten) constitution of the Low Countries and become fully sovereign in the 
process, so the VOC could punish the inhabitants of the Banda Islands for their failure to 
 
abide by the delivery contracts and conquer their territory in a ‘just war.’  The VOC 
directors and their personnel in the East showed themselves to be quick studies.  It is also 
important to note that relations between human beings, whether as individuals or as 
groups, were ordered hierarchically in most pre-modern societies.  The growth of 
capitalist economies and the substantial increases in literacy rates in north-western 
Europe in the period 1500-1800 ensured that both English and Dutch colonial officials, 
merchants and settlers would seek to preserve such hierarchical relations in writing.  Of 
course, aboriginal peoples have sought to use legal procedures of various kinds, including 
the European courts, to contest the meaning of written documents and to offer their own 
readings (The Economist, 2016). Still, the decks were heavily stacked against them in the 
past, and remain so in the present.   
Will a turn towards global constitutionalism remedy the situation?  It depends on 
what this would mean in practice.  Right now, aboriginal peoples seem to be on the 
receiving end of global constitutionalism.  Unlike TNCs, most indigenous communities 
do not have the financial wherewithal to hire the best lawyers --those consummate 
masters of the text-- in order to overturn years, if not centuries, of jurisprudence 
favouring Western settlers and capitalist economics.  In many areas of the world, 
aboriginal peoples are faced with TNCs acting as de facto sovereigns –think of the 
position of Royal Dutch Shell in the Niger Delta, for example (Obi and Rustad, 2011).  
National governments tend to treat indigenous communities as simply one more interest 
group clamouring for attention, and their complaints as actionable in domestic courts 
only. So far, no state has supported aboriginal peoples in appealing their cases to the 
international courts in The Hague.  Indeed, these courts have yet to take a single case 
 
brought by indigenous communities. There is no parity between states and aboriginal 
peoples in modern international law. Unless and until this changes, unequal treaties will 
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